Forty female subjects were given intermittent options to transmit noncontinqent promises of intent to cooperate c.uring the course of a mixed-motive laboratory game. In a 2 x 2 experimental design, a robot target either reciprocated subjects' promi: a statements or concealed her behavioral intentions, and was either always cooperative or always competitive in-response to the subjects' promises. Subjects sent more promises to the cooperative 1.han to the competitive robot, and kept their promises more often wil0A the robot reciprocated promises than when the robot used evasive replies. The results were interpreted in terlis of normative cwisideratif...s, with the reciprocal noncontingent promise seen as a contractual ..-ommitment tactic in dyadic conflicts. (Author)
SOME EFFECTS OF TARGET COOPERATIOI AND RECIPROCATED PROMISES ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION1
. Many of these articles have examined the methods employed by an individual in "getting his way" in dyadic interaction when his goals differ from another's, and when the influerce methods employed are designed to obtain overt behevior change without regard for the internal states or attitudes of the target. In the traditional analysis of the compliance si;qntioa, a eynsmic source is portrayed as influencing the behavior of a relativol.v passive target by transmitting verbal or nonverbal messages during the coniiict of interests situation. With few exceptions, this traditional 'one-way" perape,tive has led to a conceptual and empirical focus upon the acts tINft of the source or the particular mode of influence employed, to the exclusion of a consideration of the acts or attributes of the "passive' target. However, both Heider (1950 and Simmel (1950) have forcefully argued that behavioral CZ c;) compliance is a dynamic process with no "passive" recipients of influence, but only active participants; in short, a more dynamic and realistic view of the 2 influence process is needed. The present report is one of a series of studies focusing upon the effects of 'target behaviovs as determinants of source actions and attributions, and the outcome of interpersonal conflicts.
In an carlier investigation, Tedeschi, Bonoma, and Lindskold (1970) employed a modified Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG) to study a threatener's reactions to prior announcement of behavioral compliance or defiance by a target. The PDG is a two-person nonzero-sum mixed-motive conflict situation in which each participant chooses either a cooperative (Choice 1) or competitive (Choice 2) strategy alternative on each iteration of the game. cooperatively, both win (R-R payoff); if both choose competitively, both lose (P-P payoff). If one chooses cooperatively while the other chooses competitively, then the "cooperator" loses more (S-payoff) than if both had competed, and the "competitor" wins more (T-payoff) than if both had cooperated. Subjects in the Tedeschi, et al.study were given occasional opportunities to send a contingent threat to a robot target. The threat message demanded that the target make the cooperative choice (Choice 1) on the next trial of the game, or else suffet a loss of points (a negative side-payment). Subjects were empowered to enforce their threata. Four simulated target reply-and-reeponse patterns were established. if both source and target were provided with noncontingent promises (e.g., "I will cooperate on the next trial"), would the target need to both announce his conciliatory intentions and follow through by actual cooperative responses or would conflict resolution be effected by cooperation without preannouncement?
The results of the Tedeschi, et al. study would suggest that highly credible prior announcement would be a requirement for conflict resolution. However, Baldwin (1971) and Tedeschi (1970) In order to test the above hypotheses, subjects ware given intermittent opportunities to send noncontingent promises in a modified PDG. A robot player responded to subjects' promises with either an identical promise of next-trial cooperation or a statement refusing to reveal the robot's strategy intentions.
In addition, the robot either always or never selected the cooperative alternative following message exchanges. Thus, the 2 x 2 experimental design provided two levels of target replies to subjects' unilateral promises of cooperation (i.e., reciprocal promises or evasive replies) and two levels of target cooperation on message-relevant trials of the PDG (i.e., 0% or 100% cooperative). Procedure subjects were seated individually in an experimental cmAcle and were given ample time to read the dittoed instructions and explore the apparatu8.3 When the experimenter observed through a one-way mirror that the subject was no longer attending to either the instructions or apparatus, he re-entered the experimental 6 cubicle and reviewed the procedure by paraphrasing the oritten instructions.
Questions were answered by referring to the appropriate part of the instructions or the relevant feature3 of the apparatus. It was emphasized that the subject's objective in the experiment was to obtain as many game points as she could, an individualutic set. Conflict, related words, such as "game," "opponent,"
''cooperation," "competition," "Iwin," "lose," or "promise" were not used in the instructions. When the experimenter was satisfied that the subject fully understood the instructions, he informed her that he would instruct the "other girl", after which the experiment would begin.
A single message was posted on the "outgoing side of the subject's game panel.
It read, "I intend to make Choice 1 on the next trial", a noncontingent promise. Subjects were instructed that each time a certain white light on the game panel illuminated they had the option_ of sending the message to the other person. They were not informed that 10 such options would occur over the SO PDG trials, nor were they informed of the number of game trials which would be played. Subjects were instructed that the cue light indicating an opportunity to send the message would remain illuminated for ten seconds and that if a message was not sent during that period, they would resume making joint decisions.
aessage trials were defined as those Prisoner's Dilemma tribls immediately following a message transmission by a subject. The four experimental conditions were created by varying both the type of reply message used by the simulated target and the strhtegy choice of the robot on message trials. Two target reply messages were posted on the "incoming message' side of the subjects' game panel:
(111) "I will make Choice 1 on the next trial" and C12) "I do not wish to reveal my intentions." Subjects were informed that the other person could transmit a message only if the subject first initiated communication on any option trial --7 the simulated target could never initiate communications during the interaction.
The location of ths printed reply messages was systematically counterbalanced over subjects and conditions so that M2 appeared above N1 on the game panel for half the subjects in each of the four experimental treatments.
In the reciprocal-cooperation condition, the simulated target always responded to subjects' promises with 141, the reciprocal promise, and always made the cooperative (Choice 1) strategy selection on message trials. In the Ilsipmcgnalsomation condition, the robot responded to subjects' promises with reciprocal promises, but always made the noncooperative behavioral choice on the immediately following trial. In the evasive-cooperation condition, the simulated target always responded to a promise with the M2, but always made the cooperative strategy selectiou on message trials. And, in the arasive condition, subjects' promises were met with both consistent intentional evasion and behavioral noncooperation by the robot. On those message-option trials on which a subject chose not to send a message, the robot alternated cooperative and competitive strategy selections in abba order. Finally, a preplanned but unpatterned set of strategy selections was employed by the simulated target on all nonmessage iterations in order to maintain a proportion of 507 cooperative and 50% competitive strategy selections by the robot across all trials.
Following the game interaction, subjects were removed to separate testing cubicles, and were asked to give their impressions of the "other girl's" and their own behaviors on a shortened form of the Semantic Differential (Osgood et al., 1957) .
Each page of this 2-page measure (for other and for self) contained twelve polar adjectives, four for each of the three dimensions of the scale. The Evaluative dimension contain.cad the adjectives good-bad, kind-cruel, honest-dishonest, and beneficial-harmful. The activity dimension contained the adjectives active-passive, progressive-regressive, changeable-stable, and excitable-calm. The Potency dimension was measured by the polar opposites hard-soft, stronvweak, severelenient, and rash-cautious. Each item was scored from +2 to -3 and summed over each dimension. An accommodative-exploitative item was added to the other Semantic items,
Finally, subjects were requested to fill out the Interpersonal Judgment Scale developed by Byrne (1961) , which includes a measure of liking for the other person and ranges from a law score of 2 to a high score of 14. All subjects were debriefed and dismissed.
Results

ImalluaLAJLEgakEtt
As predicted, subjects in interaction, with a cooperative target sent more promises (X n 7.65) than did subjects who faced a noncooperative target (X m 8.58: 
Discussion
Both the verbal and strategic behaviors of the robot target affected he responses of subjects. If the robot target reciprocated the subjects' promises to unilaterally cooperate, subjects more often kept their promises than when the target refused to reveal his intentions in response to subjects' promises.
If the robot target cooperated on the trial following the message exChange, the subjects sent more promises to him than when the target was competitive following the message exchange. Thus, the target's verbal behavior affected the subjects' strategic choices and the target's strategic behavior affected the subjects' verbal behavior.
When the target cooperated in response to the subjects' promises, the subjects won either 4 points (by cooperating) or 5 points (by competing). When the target competed in response to the subjects' promises, the subjects lost either 5 points (by cooperating) or 4 points (by competing). It is clear that subjects were reinforced for sending promises when the target was cooperative and that subjects were punished for sending promises when the target was competitive. Positive reinforcements increased the frequency wIth which subjects sent promises and punishments inhibited the subjects' so that they sent fewer promises.
The fact that subjects more frequently cooperated following the transmission of a promise when the target reciprocated the promise cannot easily be explained on the basis of reiaforcement theory. The reciprocated promise may be interpreted as a secondary reinforcement. There are two problems with such an interpretation:
(a) reciprocal promises did not increase the frequency with which subjects initiated message exchanges; and (b) reciprocal promises could not reinforce subjects' cooperative responses on message trials because such pramises occurred before the subsequent cooperative (or competitive) responses. An alternative jo explanation might be that the tartlet's reciprocal promise to cooperate raised the subject's hopes (or subjective probability) that the target would make the rewarding cooperative response.. However, this explanation also has two problems:
(a) when the reciprocal promise was never backed up with subsequent cooperation the subjects should have had less hope of reward than when the reciprocal promise was always backed up, but the evidence did not indicate such a difference; and (b) there is no prediction about why the subjects should cooperate rather than compete if they had hope for rewards as a result of receiving reciprocal promises from the target; subjects could have won more by competing than cooperating if they believed the target was going to cooperate.
The robot target's reciprocation of subjects' promises might be viewed as creating a bilateral and mutually binding (informal) contract. In effect, the target recognized the source's commitment and made the source's promise more binding by the reciprocal statement of intent to cooperate. Essentially, when the target reciprocated the source's promises with counter-promises, the effect was to increase the source's moral obligation to carry out her promise, to mire her in her own words, so to speak, through the explicit recognition and reciprocation ogocooperative intent. On the other hand, when the target was intentionally evasive in her replies, she tacitly denied recognition to the source's promises and 'v4042004 the latter from the moral ob3igAt1on to keep the promises made. Thus, subjects established hiahar credibility for their protases when the target reciprocated promises, regardless of the target's own credibility. Vnen the subjects' commitment was implicitly denied by the evasive replies of the target, they kept their word less often (i.e., they cooperated less following the transmission of promises).
The fact that cooperative targets were perceived as more attractive than their noncooperative counterparts id not surprising --we tend to like those who reward us (irrlel, 1969) , and cooperation is easily interpretable as rewarding.
The marginal efgect of target's cooviration on attraction rattngs was buttressed by the strong effect of target cooperation on the ratings obtained on the Evaluative dimension of the Somavtic Differential. The target who sent reciprocal promises was liked better than the target who sent evasive replies to subjects' promises.
This result must b.) interpreted cautiously since it is a weak one, but it suggests that w.f.; might tend to like not only those who reward us with cooperation, but also those who oily pia that they intend to reward us. The observation that cooperative robot targets were judged to be less potent than were noncooperative targets extends a consistent pattern which has beev z49ociateo with studies employing the modified Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm as a reseamh tool (cf. Brown, Smith, & Tedeschi, 1972) . Over a series of experiments, a cooperative. or rewarding robot player has been consistently rated as wore attractive but as less potent than a competitive' or punishing robot player. Apparently, subjects associate positive attributes with weakness and negative attributes with strermth.
Two major conclusions might be drawn from the present investigation. rlrat, under conditions of mutual noncontingent promise capability, it Is apparently not necessary tnat a target both reciprocally announce an intent to cooperate and eten do so for cooperative amelioration of conflict to occur. The source's promises may be made credible if the target will simply announce cooperative intent, regardless of actual behaviors. It seems then, that within the constraints of the mixed-motive situation employedp a reciprocating target can manipulate an influence source by 'promising her anything," using such cheaply purchased statements of intent as a potent form of counter-influence. However, it is also clear that actions speak loudly as well. Cooperative acts promote the frequent employment of available communication modes as a means of conflict resolution, a 13 !inding which is not limited to noncantingent promises, but which holds when contingent threats aro the mods of influence as well (redeschi, Algol 1970) .
Competitive reactions, cn the other hand, lead to a reduction in attempted influence on the part of the source.
Secondly, it is apparently the case that noncontingent promises carry a weighting in normative or commitment value that is not present when threats ars the mode of influence. If further research can more clearly delineate this contractual component associated with the use of noncontingent promises, it may be found that such benevolent modes of influence are the most expensive a source can choose to emvloy. For by using them, an influencer becomes committed to a course of action in an almost unilateral fashion, and in effect is contracted to perform the stipulated service without a realistic regard for the potential of manipulation and exploitation by the intended target of influence. 
